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While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there 
is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This 
paper investigates the main determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 
countries, for the period 1960-1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to 
higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, 
with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher 
turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need 
to develop institutions conducive to greater economic freedom as a means to lower the 
reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the main determinants of cross-country and 
cross-time differences in seigniorage - government revenues from monopoly control over the 
creation of money. This is a challenge not yet satisfactorily confronted by the economics 
profession for three reasons. First, several political and institutional variables used as 
explanatory variables in earlier studies were relatively poorer measures of political instability 
and of the institutional environment than those available in new datasets such as the Database 
of Political Institutions (DPI), the Cross National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS), the 
Polity IV Database, and the Freedom House ratings. Second, our analysis is based on a richer 
and wider dataset, covering more countries and years than those used in previous studies, and 
includes a larger variety of alternative model specifications. Third, our models are able to 
identify the circumstances under which the relationship between political instability and 
seigniorage is stronger, a central topic of our research which is virtually absent from previous 
empirical studies on the determinants of seigniorage.  
  Relying upon the theoretical literature and using a dataset covering around 100 
countries for the period 1960-1999, we estimate panel data models to investigate the main 
economic and political determinants of seigniorage. After controlling for the countries’ 
economic structure and for several other variables that may affect seigniorage, we confirm 
Cukierman, et al. (1992) and Click(1998) finding that greater political instability leads to 
higher seigniorage levels.  
This paper’s major contribution to the literature is the identification of the 
circumstances under which the above-referred relationship is stronger. That is, we find that 
political instability has stronger effects on seigniorage levels in higher inflation than in 
moderate and low inflation countries, and also in developing than in industrial nations. In 
addition, this relationship in also stronger in countries with (i) higher central bank president  2
turnover (lower de facto central bank independence); (ii) higher social polarization, expressed 
in higher Gini coefficients; (iii) higher domestic debt levels as a percentage of GDP; and, (iv) 
with lower access to international financing (expressed in poorer creditworthiness ratings). 
Finally, authoritarian regimes and countries with low indexes of economic freedom exhibit 
stronger effects of political instability on seigniorage than democracies and economically 
freer countries. It is also worth mentioning that, besides its effects on the relationship between 
political instability and seigniorage, economic freedom is by itself a major determinant of 
seigniorage. Empirical results show quite clearly that higher degrees of economic freedom are 
associated with lower levels of seigniorage. 
  The paper is structured as follows. A survey of the empirical and theoretical literature 
on the relationship between seigniorage, political instability and institutions is presented in 
section 2. The dataset and the empirical models are described in section 3. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results, and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The political economy of seigniorage 
Most economists acknowledge that differences on the way countries conduct their 
fiscal policies are behind the variability of the seigniorage levels they sustain. But this 
explanation leads to a much deeper and fundamental question, which is why countries differ 
on the way they conduct fiscal policies (see Woo, 2003). In particular, governments that are 
able to finance their expenditures through taxes or debt do not need to rely on seigniorage 
revenues. Several studies have explored the idea that structural features of a particular 
economy help determine its “taxable capacity”. Chelliah, et al. (1975), for example, provide 
evidence that countries with larger per capita non–export income, more open to trade and with 
larger mining but smaller agricultural sectors have, on average, a higher “taxable capacity” or 
ease of collection. This result leads to the conclusion that the countries’ ability to tax is  3
technologically constrained by their stage of development and by the structure of their 
economies (e.g. size of the agricultural sector in GDP), and as tax collecting costs are high 
and tax evasion pervasive, countries might use seigniorage more frequently. But what if 
governments, independently of their countries’ economic structures, find it optimal to finance 
expenditures using seigniorage rather than levying other taxes (e.g. taxes on output)? The 
Theory of Optimal Taxation (see Phelps 1973; Végh 1989; and Aizenman 1992) rationalizes 
government behavior in many countries showing that it might be optimal for governments to 
rely on seigniorage if other taxes are highly distortionary. According to this theory,, 
governments optimally equate the marginal cost of the inflation tax with that of output taxes, 
therefore minimizing the distortions to the economy when chosing the optimal combination of 
taxes to finance their expenditures. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and Cukierman, et al. 
(1992) fail to find evidence that this theory applies to developing countries. Click (1998) 
estimates a model using 90 countries, from 1971-90, and find that only 40 percent of the 
cross-country variation in seigniorage can be explained with the Theory of Optimal Taxation. 
The empirical failure of this theory to fully explain the cross-country differences in the use of 
seigniorage revenues motivated the use of theoretical and empirical models focusing on the 
role played by political and institutional variables.  
Cukierman, et al. (1992) develop a theoretical model whereby political instability and 
polarization determine the equilibrium efficiency of the tax system and the resulting 
combination of tax revenues and seigniorage governments use. Using a probit model to 
determine the likelihood of an incumbent government to remain in power, they show evidence 
that higher political instability and polarization lead to higher seigniorage. In the empirical 
analysis of section 4, we employ alternative and more direct measures of political instability, 
such as variables that count the exact number of cabinet changes or government crises taking 
place in a particular year. Moreover, whereas they use a dummy variable for democratic  4
regimes, we use the Polity Scale (ranged between -10 and +10) to measure the degree of 
democracy in different countries.
1  
In line with Cukierman, et al. (1992), we conjecture that economies with weaker 
institutions might be unable to build efficient tax systems leading them to use more frequently 
seigniorage as a source of revenue. In the next sections, in addition to the effects of political 
instability on seigniorage, we also estimate the effects of institutions such as economic 
freedom and democracy. Besides structural variables accounting for the taxing capacity of the 
economy and political and institutional variables affecting the use of seigniorage financing of 
fiscal deficits, we also consider, in line with Click (1998), variables that measure the ability 
governments have to finance transitory expenditures with domestic or external debt. To the 
extent that a government is able to finance its expenditure through debt, there is less need to 
rely on seigniorage.  
Our main contribution to the literature is that our models not only identify the main 
political and economic determinants of seigniorage, but also reveal under which 
circumstances the effects of political instability on seigniorage are stronger. Our results, 
derived from simple econometric techniques, indicate that the causal effect of political 
instability on seigniorage is stronger in developing and high inflation countries, and in the 
decades of the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, it is also stronger in socially polarized, less 
democratic and highly indebted countries. Finally, political instability will have greater effects 
on seigniorage in countries that have lower de facto central bank independence, lower 
economic freedom and lower creditworthiness ratings. In our view, and to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no comprehensive study in the literature fully analyzing the relationship 
between political instability and seigniorage. As it will become clear in the following 
sections, this paper is an attempt to contribute in this direction. 
                                                 
1 An additional shortcoming of the analysis in Cukierman et al. (1992) is the use of a cross-sectional dataset 
using averages from 1971 to 1982 for only 79 countries, while we use a panel dataset covering around 100 
countries for the period 1960-99.   5
 
3. Data and the empirical model 
  The dataset is composed of annual data on political, institutional and economic 
variables for the years 1960 to 1999. Although we have data on seigniorage for 144 countries, 
missing values for several explanatory variables reduce the number of countries in our 
estimations to a maximum of 104. The sources of political and institutional data are: the Cross 
National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS); the Database of Political Institutions (DPI 3.0);
2 
the  Polity IV dataset;
3 Gwartney and Lawson (2002);
4 and the Freedom House ratings.
5 
Economic data was collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
and  Global Development Network Growth Database (GDN),
6 the International Monetary 
Fund’s  International Financial Statistics (IFS), the Penn World Tables (PWT 6.1),
7 
Cukierman and Webb (1995),
8 Dollar and Kraay (2002),
9 and Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003).
10 
In order to investigate the main political, institutional and economic determinants of 
seigniorage levels across countries and time, we estimate panel data models, controlling for 
countries’ fixed effects. Seigniorage is defined in two alternative ways: (1) the change in 
reserve money (line 14a of IFS-IMF) divided by nominal GDP (line 99b in IFS-IMF); (2) the 
change in reserve money (line 14a of IFS-IMF) divided by government revenues (line 81 in 
                                                 
2 On this database, see Beck et al. (2001). Available on the Internet though Philip Keefer’s page in the World 
Bank’s site (http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/pkeefer.htm). 
3 Available on the Internet (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm). 
4 Available on the Internet (http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html). This report presents data on the index of 
economic freedom and its components for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. In order to avoid a 
great number of missing values in our sample, straight-line interpolation was used to generate annual data.  
5 Available on the Internet (http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/). 
6 Available on the Internet (http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm). 
7 Available on the Internet (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php). 
8 Underlying data available on the Internet (http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/WebbPoltime2.xls). 
9 Underlying data available on the Internet (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/648083-1108140788422/Growth_is_good_for_the_poor_data.zip) 
10 Underlying data available on the Internet (http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen/base_2002.xls).  6
IFS-IMF). Table 1 shows the number of observations, means and standard deviations of these 
seigniorage measures for all countries for which data is available.
11  
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
We hypothesize that seigniorage levels depend on the following explanatory variables: 
•  A set of variables representing political instability and institutions: 
o  Cabinet Changes (CNTS), a proxy for political instability, counts the number of 
times in a year in which a new premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts 
are occupied by new ministers. A positive coefficient is expected, as greater 
instability should lead to greater reliance on seigniorage revenues; 
o  Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002). Higher indexes are 
associated with smaller governments (Area I), stronger legal structure and security 
of property rights (Area II), access to sound money (Area III), greater freedom to 
exchange with foreigners (Area IV), and more flexible regulations of credit, labor, 
and business (Area V). Since these are characteristics of more advanced economies 
with lesser need of seigniorage financing, a negative coefficient is expected; 
o  Polity Scale (Polity IV): from strongly autocratic (-10) to strongly democratic (10). 
Although the economic theory is not conclusive, we anticipate that democracy is 
associated with lower reliance on seigniorage (negative coefficient); 
•  A set of economic structural variables that reflect characteristics of the countries that may 
affect their capacity to control inflation: 
o  Agriculture (% GDP): share of the value added of agriculture in GDP (WDI, WB). 
According to Chelliah, et. al (1975), a positive coefficient is expected; 
                                                 
11 There is data on ∆RM/GDP for 144 countries and on ∆RM/GR for 122 countries.  7
o  Trade (% GDP): openness to trade (WDI, WB). Since it is associated with larger 
revenues of import duties, we expect that countries more open to trade rely less on 
seigniorage revenues (a negative coefficient is expected); 
o  Real GDP per capita (PWT 6.1). Richer countries have more efficient tax systems 
and, thus, have a lesser need for seigniorage (negative coefficient expected); 
•  Variables accounting for economic performance and external shocks: 
o  % Change in Terms of Trade (WDI, WB). Favorable evolution of terms of trade 
provides greater tax revenues (negative coefficient expected); 
o  Growth of real GDP per capita (PWT 6.1). Larger growth rates are associated with 
increasing tax revenues, reducing the need for seigniorage (negative coefficient); 
•  Variables accounting for fixed effects of countries and time: 
o  Country dummy variables; 
o  Dummy variables for each decade: 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the above-described dependent and 
independent variables and for additional/alternative explanatory variables that are used in the 
empirical analysis. 
-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
The empirical model for seigniorage levels can be summarized as follows: 






1 , = = + + + + + = − ε ν α β EcP β Eco β Inst  (1) 
Where S is seigniorage, PI is a proxy for political instability, Inst is a vector of institutional 
variables,  Eco is a vector of economic structural variables, EcP is a vector of variables 
accounting for economic performance and external shocks, νi is the fixed effect of country i, 
and εit is the error term.  
  The proxy for political instability (PIi,t-1) is lagged one period for two reasons. First, 
political instability may translate into higher seigniorage only after some time. Furthermore, if  8
a cabinet change or a government crisis occurs in the end of one year, it is very likely to lead 
to higher seigniorage only in the following year. Second, since from Aisen and Veiga 
(forthcoming) higher seigniorage leads to higher inflation, which may affect political 
instability, using the contemporaneous value of political instability could create 
simultaneity/endogeneity problems. Taking the first lag avoids these problems, as current 
seigniorage does not affect past political instability.
12 
 
4. Empirical Results 
  The first objective of our empirical analysis is to identify the main political, 
institutional and economic determinants of seigniorage levels across countries and time. Then, 
after finding strong support for our hypothesis that greater political instability leads to higher 
seigniorage, we try to determine under which circumstances or country characteristics that 
relationship is stronger. Finally, we perform a sensitivity analysis which checks whether or 
not the main results hold when an alternative definition of seigniorage is used, when the 
sample only includes developing countries, and when our main proxy for political instability 
is defined in a different way.  
 
a) Main determinants of seigniorage levels 
The estimation results of the model described in the previous section, using a fixed 
effects specification,
13 are shown in Table 3. The dependent variable is the change in reserve 
money as a percentage of GDP. All explanatory variables described in the previous section 
were included in the estimation reported in column 1. Since the Index of Economic Freedom 
is highly correlated with Real GDP per capita and its Area III – Freedom to exchange with 
                                                 
12 The contemporaneous values are used for the remaining explanatory variables, since they are taken as 
exogenous. It is also worth noting that seigniorage is not persistent (its first lag is never statistically significant 
when included as an explanatory variable) and that the error term of equation (1), εit, is not serially correlated.   
13 Hausmann tests indicate that the fixed effects specification is preferable to a random effects model and to a 
simple OLS model.  9
foreigners – already represents openness to trade, the variables Real GDP per capita and 
Trade (%GDP) were not included in the model of column 2. Then, in column 3, the five 
component areas of the Index of Economic Freedom are included, so that we can determine 
which have greater effects on seigniorage. 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
The results reported in the first three columns of Table 3 confirm the hypothesis that 
greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage levels, and show that the effects are 
sizeable: an additional cabinet change increases seigniorage by around 0.24 (an increase of 
13% relative to the sample mean of 1.87). Economic freedom also has important effects on 
inflation: a move of one point up the scale (towards greater freedom) reduces seigniorage by 
roughly 1.2 (a decrease of 64% relative to the sample mean). Of its five component areas, 
only Area III (Access to sound money) and Area IV (Freedom to exchange with foreigners) 
are statistically significant, with a negative sign. Democracy does not seem to affect 
seigniorage levels, as Polity Scale is never statistically significant. Concerning the economic 
variables, only Growth of Real GDP per capita has statistically significant negative effects on 
seigniorage, as expected.
14 
The Index of Economic Freedom, for which data is available only after 1970, was not 
included in the last three estimations reported in Table 3. Its exclusion allows for the 
reintroduction of Trade (%GDP)  and Real GDP per capita in the model, and causes several 
changes in results: the estimated coefficient and the degree of statistical significance of 
Cabinet Changes increases;  Agriculture (%GDP) becomes highly statistically significant, 
Real GDP per capita, although close to zero, becomes highly significant and changes sign 
relative to column 1; Growth of Real GDP per capita  exhibits lower significance levels; and 
the ten-year period dummies are highly statistically significant. Although Trade (%GDP) has 
                                                 
14 Since the ten-year period dummies were not jointly statistically significant in these three estimations, the 
results reported are for the models that do not include them.   10
a positive sign and is statistically significant in the estimation of column 4, it is not significant 
when the alternative definition of seigniorage is used (result not reported). In column 5, the 
interaction variable External trade shocks, which is the product of Trade (%GDP) and 
%Change in terms of trade, is used instead of those two variables. Since it is not statistically 
significant, it is not included in the model of column 6, which is the reference for the models 
of the following tables. The positive and significant coefficients of the ten-year dummies 
indicate that seigniorage levels were higher in the 1980s, followed by the 1990s and the 
1970s. The lowest levels of seigniorage were obtained in the 1960s, whose dummy variable 
was left out of the models.
15 
Results regarding political instability and economic freedom conform to our 
expectations and are consistent with those found by Aisen and Veiga (forthcoming) for 
inflation levels, and with the positive relationship between seigniorage and political instability 
identified by Cukierman, et. al (1992) using cross sectional data. Those concerning economic 
variables are consistent with the findings of previous studies, such as Chelliah, et. al (1975), 
Edwards and Tabellini (1991), and Click (1998), indicating that larger agricultural sectors and 
lower GDP per capita levels are associated with greater reliance on seigniorage revenues. Our 
expectation that lower rates of GDP growth reduce seigniorage also receives empirical 
support. 
The results of a series of robustness tests, based on the model of column 6 of Table 3, 
are shown in Table 4. In columns 1 and 2, the Freedom House ratings of Political Rights and 
Civil Liberties, respectively, are used instead of the Polity Scale. Both have positive signs, 
indicating that higher values, associated with less rights and liberties, lead to higher 
seigniorage, but only Civil Liberties is marginally statistically significant. Since this result 
                                                 
15 Results are virtually identical when using annual dummies. The same is true when a time trend and time trend 
squared are included in the estimations instead of the time dummies.  11
does not hold when we use the alternative definition of seigniorage, there is no robust 
evidence that democracy affects seigniorage levels.
16  
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
 In  column  3  Ideological Polarization (DPI) is included in the base model. Although it 
has a positive sign, as expected, it is not statistically significant. The Ideological Orientation 
of the executive (higher values stand for more leftist governments) enters the model of 
column 4. Results indicate that more leftist executives are associated with higher seigniorage 
levels. This is consistent with Hibb’s (1977) hypothesis that left-wing oriented governments 
are relatively less concerned with inflation than right-wing ones. Results shown in columns 5 
to 7 indicate that urbanization, trading partners GDP growth, and external debt do not affect 
seigniorage in a statistically significant way.
17 Those of columns 8 and 9 are consistent with 
our expectation that more currency inside banks and exchange rate regimes closer to fixed 
exchange rates
18 lead to lower seigniorage levels.
19 Finally, the results of column 10 confirm 
Click’s (1998) result that seigniorage will be higher when the international creditworthiness 
of the country is lower.
20 That is, when external borrowing is less available (or costlier), the 
government has to rely more heavily on seigniorage revenues. 
                                                 
16 This latter result is not shown. Indicators of Executive Constraints (CNTS) and of Checks and Balances (DPI) 
are not statistically significant when included. All results not shown in the paper are available from the authors 
upon request. 
17 The same applies to de jure central bank independence, U.S. Treasury Bill rates, real effective exchange rates, 
current account balance, and government revenues as a percentage of GDP (these results are not shown).  
18 The result reported in column 9 is for the 5-way classification system of de facto exchange rate regimes of 
Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). Results are the same when their 3-way classification system is used 
instead. Since their data starts only in 1974, the inclusion of this variable originates a large number of missing 
values. That is why it was not included in the models of the previous Tables. When included, it is always 
statistically significant, with a negative sign. 
19 More currency inside banks may signal a smaller informal sector, which eases regular tax collection, making 
seigniorage less necessary to finance government expenses; and, fixed exchange rates constrain monetary policy 
to the defense of the fixed parity and, thus, make the collection of seigniorage revenues harder. 
20 Data on the Euromoney creditworthiness index, raging from 0 to 100, from 1982 to 1999, was kindly provided 
by Reid Click.  12
b) Circumstances under which the effects of political instability on seigniorage are stronger 
Although our results regarding the relationship between political instability and 
seigniorage are quite robust, it is possible that they are stronger in some circumstances or in 
countries with specific characteristics. Aisen and Veiga (forthcoming) found that political 
instability affected inflation levels especially in high inflation and developing countries, 
whereas that relationship was practically nonexistent in low inflation and industrialized 
countries. In order to check if the same happens with seigniorage, we performed estimations 
in which Cabinet Changes was interacted with dummy variables accounting for annual 
inflation rates above and below 50% and for developing and industrial countries. Results, 
shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, are consistent with the results of Aisen and Veiga 
(forthcoming). That is, greater political instability, expressed in a higher number of cabinet 
changes, leads to higher seigniorage levels only in high inflation and developing countries. 
According to Woo (2003), social polarization, which can be proxied by income 
inequality, and the quality of institutions are important determinants of budget deficits. In 
highly polarized societies (where there is high income inequality), there is a high polarization 
of preferences among political parties and interest groups for different types of government 
spending. Then, according to the model of Cukierman, et al. (1992), high polarization of 
interests will lead to higher seigniorage, in the presence of high political instability. The 
quality of institutions is also very important because more stringent and transparent budgetary 
procedures, independence of the central bank, and greater parliamentary influence in the 
budgetary process can reduce the government’s ability to increase budget deficits and extract 
seigniorage revenues. 
The hypothesis that the relationship between seigniorage and political instability is 
affected by social polarization (income inequality) is tested in column 3 of Table 5, where 
Cabinet Changes was interacted with dummy variables for average Gini coefficients above  13
and below 40.
21 Results suggest that political instability only leads to higher seigniorage in 
countries with large social polarization.
22 The hypothesis that institutions affect that 
relationship was tested in columns 4 to 6, where Cabinet Changes was interacted with dummy 
variables for high and low turnover rates of central bank presidents,
23 high and low economic 
freedom,
24 and Polity Scale below and above zero. The results of column 3 imply that greater 
political instability will lead to higher seigniorage only when there is a high turnover rate of 
central bank presidents, that is, when the de facto independence of the central bank is low. 
When independence is high, seigniorage does not increase, as the government is no longer 
able to affect reserve money.
25 Political instability also seems to affect seigniorage only in 
countries that have a low Index of Economic Freedom (column 5). This implies that the 
establishment of sounder and freer economic institutions is a way to avoid the above-referred 
relationship.
26 More democratic institutions also seem to matter, as the results of column 6 
indicate that democracies (Polity Scale>0) are associated with lower effects of political 
instability on seigniorage than authoritarian regimes (Polity Scale≤ 0).  
--- Insert Table 5 about here --- 
Click (1998) showed that when governments face greater constraints to issue domestic 
and/or external debt, they will tend to resort more often to seigniorage revenues. We 
                                                 
21 The dummy Gini>40 takes the value of one for countries whose average Gini coefficient is above 40, and 
equals zero for the remaining countries. (Gini≤ 40) = 1 – (Gini>40). 
22 We also used ethnic diversity as a proxy for social polarization, but results were far from clear. They depended 
heavily on the cutoff level of diversity after which we classified it as high. 
23 Cukierman and Webb (1995) use this turnover rate as an indicator of de facto central bank independence. The 
dummy High Turnover takes the value of one when the turnover rate is above the sample median of 0.20, and is 
zero otherwise. Low turnover = 1 – High Turnover.  
24 The dummy variable High Economic Freedom takes the value of one when the Index of Economic Freedom is 
greater than 5, and equals zero otherwise. Low Economic Freedom = 1- High Economic Freedom. 
25 It is worth noting that this result does not hold when the Cukierman and Webb (1995) legal index of Central 
Bank Independence is used instead of the turnover rate of presidents (that proxies de facto independence). This 
may happen because what really matters for the conduct of monetary policy is the de facto independence and not 
what is written in the central bank law.  
26 When the five component areas of the Index of Economic Freedom are used, the results (not shown here) are 
the same for all except the first (size of government). That is, political instability affects seigniorage when there 
is a weaker legal structure and lower security of property rights, low access to sound money, lower freedom to 
exchange with foreigners, and less flexible regulations of credit, labor, and business.  14
hypothesize that the effects of political instability on seigniorage levels also depend on the 
ratios of domestic debt to GDP and on the countries’s creditworthiness. That is, when greater 
political instability leads to higher deficits, the government will resort more often to 
seigniorage revenues to finance them when domestic or foreign borrowing is more difficult 
(or costlier). The results of columns 3 and 4 provide empirical support for the above-referred 
hypothesis, as a greater number of Cabinet Changes is associated with higher seigniorage 
only in countries that have High Domestic Debt (column 3)
27 or Low Creditworthiness 
(column 4).
28 
The effects of political instability on seigniorage were felt essentially during the 1970s 
and 1980s (see column 3), which is consistent with the fact that both political instability and 
seigniorage levels were higher in these decades. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 report the results 
of interacting Cabinet Changes with regional dummy variables. Those of column 1 indicate 
that the positive effect of political instability on seigniorage (defined as the ratio of the change 
in reserve money to GDP) is statistically significant only for Western Hemisphere (Latin 
American) countries. But, when the alternative definition of seigniorage (ratio of the change 
in reserve money to government revenues) is used, there are also significant effects for 
African countries (column 2).
29 
--- Insert Table 6 about here --- 
                                                 
27 High Domestic Debt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the countries whose average ratio of 
domestic debt to GDP is above the countries’ median ratio (13.28), and takes the value of zero otherwise. Low 
Domestic Debt = 1 – High Domestic Debt. 
28 High Creditworthiness is a dummy variable that equals one for the countries whose average Euromoney’s 
creditworthiness rating is above 60 (the 75
th percentile of the country averages), and equals zero otherwise. Low 
Creditworthiness=1- High Creditworthiness.  
29 We also estimated a series of models for a sample which excluded Western Hemisphere countries, in order to 
further check if the relationship found between political instability and seigniorage was not only applicable to 
that region. Results, not shown here, clearly indicate that this relationship is also valid for the rest of the World.    15
c) Sensitivity analysis 
Table 7 shows the results of the interactions of alternative proxies of political 
instability with annual inflation rates above or below 50%. These proxies for political 
instability are defined as:  
o  Government Crises (CNTS): counts the number of rapidly developing situations in 
a year that threaten to bring the downfall of the present regime; 
o  Executive changes (CNTS): counts the number of times in a year that effective 
control of the executive power changes hands; 
o  Index of Political Cohesion (DPI): 0 to 3 index based on Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
in which greater values imply lower cohesion (coalition or minority governments). 
As happened in Column 1 of Table 5, only the interactions with Inflation≥50  are 
statistically significant. Thus, these results are robust to the use of different proxies for 
political instability. 
--- Insert Table 7 about here --- 
  Columns 1 to 4 of Table 8 report the results obtained for the alternative definition of 
seigniorage: Change in Reserve Money as a percentage of Government Revenues. In the 
models of columns 5 to 7 the sample contains only developing countries, and seigniorage is 
defined as in the previous tables. Finally, in the models of columns 8 to 11, a three year 
moving average of Cabinet Changes was used instead of its annual values, in order to better 
capture eventual persistent situations of political instability. In all cases, results are very 
similar to those obtained in Tables 3 and 4, meaning that our conclusions regarding the effects 
of political and economic variables on seigniorage levels remained practically the same. 
--- Insert Table 8 about here ---  16
5. Conclusions 
  The main purpose of this paper was to identify the major determinants of the cross-
country and cross-time variability of seigniorage. Using a dataset covering about 100 
countries, from 1960-1999, and applying standard panel data techniques, we found that 
greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage. This result confirms the findings of 
previous studies such as Cukierman, et al. (1992) and Click (1998). 
  Our major contribution to the literature is that, in addition to the above-referred result, 
we succeeded to comprehensively determine the circumstances under which political 
instability has a greater impact on seigniorage, a topic that, in our opinion, is very important 
but received little attention in previous studies. Our results indicate that the effect of political 
instability on seigniorage is stronger in high-inflation, developing, highly indebted, less 
democratic, and socially polarized economies. Moreover, this relationship is particularly 
strong in Latin America, but not exclusive to this region. Finally, we also found that countries 
with high turnover rates of central bank presidents (with lower de facto central bank 
independence), with lower levels of economic freedom, and with poorer creditworthiness 
ratings rely more on seigniorage to finance their deficits.  
  The results of this study have policy implications that greatly contribute to the policy 
debate in high inflation (seigniorage) and politically unstable economies. Our results show 
that countries adopting policies targeting greater economic freedom, institutional 
strengthening, such as new laws governing central bank independence, and reduced income 
inequality, limit the negative effect of political instability on seigniorage improving their 
chances of successfully lowering their dependence on seigniorage revenues to finance their 
governments’ deficits. After some time, they should benefit from lower inflation and, 
consequently, higher growth and economic prosperity.  17
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Table 1: Seigniorage across countries 
           Obs   Mean   StDev             Obs   Mean   StDev             Obs   Mean   StDev 
ALGERIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  31   .033   .018 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
   ∆RM/GDP  22   .013   .035 
ARGENTINA 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .060   .078 
   ∆RM/GR   18  1.203  1.287 
ARMENIA 
   ∆RM/GDP   5   .026   .026 
AUSTRALIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .004   .007 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .022   .036 
AUSTRIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .005   .002 
   ∆RM/GR   37   .020   .013 
BAHAMAS 
   ∆RM/GDP  23   .004   .004 
   ∆RM/GR   30   .022   .043 
BAHRAIN 
   ∆RM/GDP  24   .008   .022 
   ∆RM/GR   24   .031   .073 
BANGLADESH 
   ∆RM/GDP  25   .009   .008 
BARBADOS 
   ∆RM/GDP  32   .009   .014 
   ∆RM/GR   25   .035   .047 
BELARUS 
   ∆RM/GDP   4   .042   .014 
   ∆RM/GR    4   .134   .047 
BELGIUM 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .005   .005 
   ∆RM/GR   36   .019   .022 
BELIZE 
   ∆RM/GDP  22   .010   .012 
   ∆RM/GR   19   .041   .052 
BENIN 
   ∆RM/GDP  36   .008   .018 
BHUTAN 
   ∆RM/GDP  15   .035   .053 
   ∆RM/GR   13   .184   .294 
BOLIVIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .026   .031 
   ∆RM/GR   35   .481  1.076 
BOTSWANA 
   ∆RM/GDP  22   .005   .011 
   ∆RM/GR   20   .012   .030 
BRAZIL 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .036   .027 
   ∆RM/GR   35   .247   .187 
BULGARIA 
   ∆RM/GDP   7   .068   .036 
   ∆RM/GR    7   .001   .0001 
BURKINA FASO 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .010   .012 
   ∆RM/GR   26   .096   .109 
BURUNDI 
   ∆RM/GDP  34   .007   .010 
CAMEROON 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .005   .008 
   ∆RM/GR   20   .021   .058 
CANADA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .003   .002 
   ∆RM/GR   35   .021   .013 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. 
   ∆RM/GDP  37   .011   .018 
CHAD 
   ∆RM/GDP  28   .010   .020 
   ∆RM/GR   17   .089   .232 
CHILE 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .069   .077 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .283   .281 
 
CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND 
   ∆RM/GDP  13   .063   .026 
   ∆RM/GR   13   .474   .250 
CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG 
   ∆RM/GDP   8   .007   .005 
COLOMBIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  37   .019   .009 
   ∆RM/GR    5   .059   .094 
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF 
   ∆RM/GDP  29   .056   .141 
   ∆RM/GR   30   .813  1.983 
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .006   .012 
COSTA RICA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .026   .024 
   ∆RM/GR   29   .230   .189 
COTE D IVOIRE 
   ∆RM/GDP  36   .010   .013 
CROATIA 
   ∆RM/GR    5   .057   .043 
CYPRUS 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .023   .026 
   ∆RM/GR   33   .127   .138 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
   ∆RM/GDP   5   .035   .036 
   ∆RM/GR    5   .114   .114 
DENMARK 
   ∆RM/GDP  39    .00   .012 
   ∆RM/GR   36   .015   .029 
DOMINICA 
   ∆RM/GDP  22   .015   .053 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .015   .016 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .111   .127 
ECUADOR 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .018   .010 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .147   .084 
EGYPT 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .039   .031 
   ∆RM/GR   20   .129   .062 
EL SALVADOR 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .013   .018 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
   ∆RM/GDP  12   .001   .059 
ESTONIA 
   ∆RM/GDP   7   .039   .034 
   ∆RM/GR    6   .159   .147 
ETHIOPIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .013   .017 
   ∆RM/GR   33   .112   .124 
FIJI 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .008   .015 
   ∆RM/GR   29   .039   .070 
FINLAND 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .002   .002 
   ∆RM/GR   37   .008   .011 
FRANCE 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .004   .004 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .017   .021 
GABON 
   ∆RM/GDP  37   .005   .010 
GAMBIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  30   .016   .029 
   ∆RM/GR   26   .083   .176 
GERMANY 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .004   .002 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .019   .011 
GHANA 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .024   .020 
   ∆RM/GR   34   .245   .272 
 
GREECE 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .024   .013 
   ∆RM/GR   37   .120   .065 
GRENADA 
   ∆RM/GDP  26   .017   .027 
   ∆RM/GR   12   .087   .114 
GUATEMALA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .010   .011 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .117   .137 
GUINEA-BISSAU 
   ∆RM/GDP  10   .010   .007 
   ∆RM/GR    6   .436   .214 
GUYANA 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .050   .095 
   ∆RM/GR   37   .139   .259 
HAITI 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .015   .021 
   ∆RM/GR   32   .231   .359 
HONDURAS 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .011   .012 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .074   .074 
HUNGARY 
   ∆RM/GDP  13   .025   .045 
   ∆RM/GR   13   .052   .088 
ICELAND 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .019   .016 
   ∆RM/GR   31   .084   .073 
INDIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .014   .006 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .132   .049 
INDONESIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  33   .016   .010 
   ∆RM/GR   29   .081   .056 
IRAN 
   ∆RM/GDP  34   .032   .026 
   ∆RM/GR   23   .199   .162 
IRELAND 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .008   .014 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .028   .060 
ISRAEL 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .086   .121 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .173   .208 
ITALY 
   ∆RM/GDP  36   .007   .003 
   ∆RM/GR   36   .040   .028 
JAMAICA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .021   .021 
JAPAN 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .009   .006 
   ∆RM/GR   34   .084   .062 
JORDAN 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .044   .043 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .225   .203 
KAZAKHSTAN 
   ∆RM/GR    5   .115   .161 
KENYA 
   ∆RM/GDP  32   .014   .014 
   ∆RM/GR   28   .061   .059 
KOREA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .014   .013 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .100   .099 
KUWAIT 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .002   .019 
   ∆RM/GR   31   .005   .044 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 
   ∆RM/GDP   3   .015   .007 
   ∆RM/GR    3   .089   .045 
LAO PEOPLE'S DEM.REP 
   ∆RM/GDP   9   .014   .009 
LATVIA 
   ∆RM/GDP   5   .016   .012 
   ∆RM/GR    4   .048   .037  20
Table 1 (cont.): Seigniorage across countries 
           Obs   Mean   StDev             Obs   Mean   StDev             Obs   Mean   StDev 
LEBANON 
   ∆RM/GR    4   .406   .224 
LESOTHO 
   ∆RM/GDP  18   .019   .024 
   ∆RM/GR   17   .050   .065 
LIBYA 
   ∆RM/GDP  33   .027   .033 
LITHUANIA 
   ∆RM/GDP   5   .020   .011 
   ∆RM/GR    5   .083   .048 
LUXEMBOURG 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .003   .015 
   ∆RM/GR   21   .015   .053 
MADAGASCAR 
   ∆RM/GDP  36   .011   .013 
   ∆RM/GR   21   .112   .153 
MALAWI 
   ∆RM/GDP  33   .014   .023 
MALAYSIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .018   .020 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .063   .142 
MALDIVES 
   ∆RM/GR   20   .248   .350 
MALI 
   ∆RM/GDP  36   .013   .018 
MALTA 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .059   .091 
   ∆RM/GR   36   .157   .268 
MAURITANIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  31   .006   .029 
   ∆RM/GR   12   .034   .126 
MAURITIUS 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .015   .028 
   ∆RM/GR   32   .090   .148 
MEXICO 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .022   .024 
   ∆RM/GR   27   .235   .220 
MOLDOVA 
   ∆RM/GDP   6   .077   .075 
MONGOLIA 
   ∆RM/GDP   6   .039   .022 
   ∆RM/GR    5   .197   .118 
MOROCCO 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .015   .009 
   ∆RM/GR   31   .071   .042 
MOZAMBIQUE 
   ∆RM/GDP  11   .074   .049 
MYANMAR 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .028   .048 
   ∆RM/GR   33   .332   .516 
NAMIBIA 
   ∆RM/GDP   7   .006   .005 
   ∆RM/GR    3   .016   .023 
NEPAL 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .014   .008 
   ∆RM/GR   37   .223   .149 
NETHERLANDS 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .004   .003 
   ∆RM/GR   13   .004   .006 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 
   ∆RM/GR   23   .066   .178 
NEW ZEALAND 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .001   .008 
   ∆RM/GR   37   .006   .029 
NICARAGUA 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .058   .091 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .255   .370 
NIGER 
   ∆RM/GDP  36   .004   .010 
NIGERIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .014   .016 
   ∆RM/GR   34   .136   .168 
NORWAY 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .005   .005 
   ∆RM/GR   37   .020   .016 
OMAN 
   ∆RM/GDP  28   .009   .013 
   ∆RM/GR   27   .024   .033 
PAKISTAN 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .019   .010 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .126   .069 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
   ∆RM/GDP  20   .005   .024 
   ∆RM/GR   20   .028   .126 
PARAGUAY 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .018   .010 
   ∆RM/GR   34   .177   .094 
PERU 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .034   .029 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .282   .300 
PHILIPPINES 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .010   .007 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .074   .054 
POLAND 
   ∆RM/GDP  18   .050   .059 
   ∆RM/GR    9   .067   .088 
PORTUGAL 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .014   .021 
   ∆RM/GR   27   .075   .142 
QATAR 
   ∆RM/GDP  31   .005   .006 
ROMANIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  19   .031   .035 
   ∆RM/GR   23   .076   .084 
RUSSIA 
   ∆RM/GR    4   .185   .077 
RWANDA 
   ∆RM/GDP  34   .006   .008 
   ∆RM/GR   20   .124   .120 
SAUDI ARABIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .009   .015 
SENEGAL 
   ∆RM/GDP  36   .005   .014 
SEYCHELLES 
   ∆RM/GDP  27   .014   .037 
   ∆RM/GR   21   .040   .098 
SIERRA LEONE 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .023   .026 
   ∆RM/GR   37   .268   .362 
SINGAPORE 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .016   .012 
   ∆RM/GR   35   .066   .057 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
   ∆RM/GDP   5   .020   .022 
SLOVENIA 
   ∆RM/GDP   5   .010   .003 
   ∆RM/GR    6   .023   .007 
SOUTH AFRICA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .007   .015 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .027   .022 
SPAIN 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .011   .004 
   ∆RM/GR   37   .078   .040 
SRI LANKA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .012   .009 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .063   .051 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 
   ∆RM/GDP  18   .016   .036 
   ∆RM/GR   10   .057   .051 
ST. LUCIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  22   .012   .014 
ST. VINCENT & GRENS. 
   ∆RM/GDP  22   .015   .034 
   ∆RM/GR   20   .049   .121 
SUDAN 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .035   .031 
   ∆RM/GR   17  202.3  425.5 
SURINAME 
   ∆RM/GDP  31   .069   .074 
SWAZILAND 
   ∆RM/GDP  23   .016   .027 
   ∆RM/GR   24   .057   .105 
SWEDEN 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .005   .011 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .015   .034 
SWITZERLAND 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .009   .015 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .110   .172 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 
   ∆RM/GDP  34   .050   .039 
   ∆RM/GR   21   .176   .106 
TANZANIA 
   ∆RM/GR   31   .135   .083 
THAILAND 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .010   .004 
   ∆RM/GR   39   .068   .029 
TOGO 
   ∆RM/GDP  35   .011   .033 
TONGA 
   ∆RM/GDP  12   .012   .074 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
   ∆RM/GDP  38   .008   .016 
   ∆RM/GR   30   .023   .054 
TUNISIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .010   .008 
   ∆RM/GR   25   .041   .026 
TURKEY 
   ∆RM/GDP  12   .031   .006 
   ∆RM/GR   29   .179   .052 
UGANDA 
   ∆RM/GDP  24   .018   .013 
   ∆RM/GR   22   .367   .395 
UKRAINE 
   ∆RM/GDP   5   .074   .072 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
   ∆RM/GDP  23   .009   .013 
   ∆RM/GR   16  4.215  8.255 
UNITED KINGDOM 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .004   .005 
   ∆RM/GR   36   .013   .015 
UNITED STATES 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .003   .001 
   ∆RM/GR   36   .021   .009 
URUGUAY 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .049   .029 
   ∆RM/GR   33   .267   .175 
VANUATU 
   ∆RM/GDP  14   .012   .017 
VENEZUELA 
   ∆RM/GDP  39   .015   .016 
   ∆RM/GR   38   .066   .071 
YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF 
   ∆RM/GDP   7   .050   .048 
   ∆RM/GR    8   .261   .298 
ZAMBIA 
   ∆RM/GDP  30   .019   .022 
   ∆RM/GR   29   .087   .105 
ZIMBABWE 
   ∆RM/GDP  21   .010   .007 
   ∆RM/GR   18   .042   .026 
 
RM: Reserve Money (IMF-IFS-14a) 
GDP: Nominal GDP (IMF-IFS-99b) 
GR: Government Revenues (IMF- 
    IFS-81)  21
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables                 Obs.    Mean  Std.Dev.   Min.     Max.    Source 
Dependent: 
∆ Reserve Money (%GDP)    4376     1.87    3.62   -29.40    65.53   IFS-IFM 
∆ Reserve Money (% Government Revenues) 
                          3189   122.22 3355.86  -380.78 151882.8   IFS-IFM 
Explanatory: 
Agriculture (% GDP)       4255    22.52   16.45     0.13    78.01   WDI-WB 
Cabinet Changes           5667      .44     .60     0        5      CNTS 
Central Bank Independence 1942      .34     .12     0.09     0.69   CWN 
Change in Terms of Trade  3978   220801  1.5e+7   -6.3e+7  9.8e+8   WDI-WB 
Checks and Balances       3397     2.08    1.38     1       15      DPI 
Civil Liberties           4356     3.94    1.92     1        7    Freedom H 
Creditworthiness          1988    48.13   25.00     2.01   100    Euromoney 
Currency Inside Banks     5088    -1.73   27.35 -1052.28     1.26   IFS-IFM 
Current Account (%GDP)    3111    -4.11   10.67  -240.52    58.55   WDI-WB 
Debt Service (%Exports)   2432    17.25   14.92     0      185.95   WDI-WB 
Domestic Debt (%GDP)      1163   200.57 2588.54     0.12 52345.17   IFS-IMF 
Exchange Rate Regime      3345     4.06    1.28     1        5      LYS 
Executive Changes         5701      .19     .46     0        4      CNTS 
Executive Constraints     5339     3.87    2.41     0        7    Polity IV 
External Debt (%GDP)      2975    67.31   85.18     0     1205      GDN-WB 
External Trade Shocks     3978   2.6e+7  1.7e+9  -3.4e+9  1.1e+11   WDI-WB 
Gini Coefficient           693    37.49   10.64    16.63    74.33   DK 
Govern. Revenues (%GDP)   2561    19.51    9.64     0       50.57   WDI-WB 
Government Crises         5572      .17     .52     0        7      CNTS 
Growth of Real GDPpc      4982     2.03    6.72   -41.91    77.69   PWT-6.1 
Growth Trading Partners   5180     2.37    1.90   -14.61     9.35   GDN-WB 
Ideological Orientation   3259     1.41    1.28     0        3      DPI 
Ideological Polarization  3213      .30     .69     0        2      DPI 
Index of Economic Freedom 2958     5.70    1.19     2.30     9.05   GL 
      Area I              3390     5.30    1.63     0.65     9.74   GL 
      Area II             2688     5.44    1.87     1.14     9.62   GL 
      Area III            3534     6.34    2.14     0        9.86   GL 
      Area IV             3063     5.83    1.74     0        9.97   GL 
      Area V              2913     5.43    1.11     2.47     8.85   GL 
Index Political Cohesion  3438      .71     .79     0        3      DPI 
Inflation (Annual Rate)   4820    40.90  455.16   -36.74 23773.1    IFS-IFM 
Political Rights          4356     3.93    2.22     1        7    Freedom H 
Polity Scale              5344      .08    7.62   -10       10    Polity IV 
Real Effective Exch. Rate 1433   116.40   65.75    37.10   921.41   WDI-WB 
Real GDP per capita       5075  5936.76 6111.80   281.25  44008.5   PWT-6.1 
Trade (%GDP)              4815    70.06   46.37     0      439.59   WDI-WB 
Turnover Rate Governors   1990      .24     .20     0        1.08   CWN 
U.S. Treasury Bill Rate   7298     6.00    2.50     2.38    14.08   IFS-IFM 
Urban Population (%Total) 6688    43.90   24.25     1.75   100      WDI-WB 
Notes: IFS-IMF: International Financial Statistics - International Monetary 
Fund; WDI-WB: World Development Indicators – World Bank; GDN-WB: Global 
Development Network Growth Database – World Bank; CNTS: Cross-National Time 
Series Database; DPI: Database of Political Institutions; Freedom H: 
Freedom House Rankings; GL: Gwartney and Lawson (2002); PWT-6.1: Penn World 
Tables (Mark 6.1); CWN: based on Cukierman and Webb (1995); LYS: Levi-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003); DK: Dollar and Kraay (2002).  22
Table 3: Results for Seigniorage 
Seigniorage 1  2  3  4  5  6 


















    
Area I      .238 
(1.47) 
   
Area II      .016 
(.16) 
   
Area III      -.228 
(-2.57)** 
   
Area IV      -.721 
(-3.68)*** 
   
Area V      -.528 
(-1.42) 
   
























Trade (% GDP)  .009 
(1.08) 
   .018 
(2.01)** 
  











External trade shocks          -.24e-09 
(-.65) 
 
Real GDP per capita  .0001 
(1.94)* 






































427 427 # Observations  1558  1558  1244  2221  2223  2383 
# Countries  86  86  78  97  97  98 
Adjusted R
2  .30 .30 .31  .24  .23  .23 
Notes: -  Panel regressions controlling for fixed effects; 
-  Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the ratio of the change in 
reserve money (IFS, line 14) to nominal GDP (IFS line 99b); 
-  Models estimated with a constant; 
-  T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 4: Robustness tests 
Seigniorage 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
































































































Political Rights  .026 
(.31) 
          
Civil Liberties    .184 
(1.73)* 
         
Ideological Polarization      .041 
(.29) 
        
Ideological Orientation        .361 
(2.51)** 
      
Urban Population (% of total 
population) 
     .006 
(.46) 
     
Growth of Trading Partners 
GDP 
       .064 
(1.36) 
    
External Debt (%GDP)              .006 
(1.61) 
   
Currency Inside Banks  
(M2-C)/M2 
         -.026 
(-2.79)*** 
  
Exchange Rate Regime                  -.0233 
(-2.42)** 
 
Creditworthiness             -.037 
(-2.18)** 
#  Observations  1989 1989 1648 1645  2911 2253 1552 2358 1451 1140 
#  Countries  104  104 96 96  100  93 76 97 94 97 
Adjusted R
2  .24 .24 .27 .25  .23 .23 .22 .23 .22 .33 
Notes:  -  Panel regressions with fixed effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
-  Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the ratio of the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14a) to total nominal GDP (IFS, line 99b); 
-  Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Their estimated coefficients are not shown in order to economize space. 
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Table 5: Results for Interactions of Cabinet Changes 
Seigniorage 1  2  3  4  5  6 
[Cabinet changes * 
(Inflation ≥ 50%)] (-1) 
1.632 
(2.49)** 
       
[Cabinet changes * 
(Inflation < 50%)] (-1) 
.071 
(.68) 
       




      




      
[Cabinet changes *  
(Gini > 40)] (-1) 
   .531 
(2.67)*** 
   
[Cabinet changes *  
(Gini ≤ 40))] (-1) 
   .025 
(.24) 
   
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Turnover)] (-1) 
    .475 
(1.97)** 
  
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Turnover)] (-1) 
    .089 
(.91) 
  
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Econ. Freedom)] (-1) 
     .774 
(3.41)*** 
 
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Econ. Freedom)] (-1) 
     .100 
(.95) 
 
[Cabinet changes * 
(Polity Scale ≤ 0)] (-1) 
      .364 
(2.13)** 
[Cabinet changes * 
(Polity Scale > 0)] (-1) 
      .222 
(1.89)* 


















































427 427 # Observations  2260  2383  2311  1779  2102  2383 
# Countries  98  98  98  97  97  98 
Adjusted R
2  .25 .23 .27 .22 .24  .23 
Notes: -  Panel regressions controlling for fixed effects; 
-  Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the ratio of the change in reserve money (IFS, 
line 14) to total nominal GDP (IFS, line 99b); 
-  Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Their estimated 
coefficients are not shown in order to economize space; 
-  T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 
5%, and *, 10%.  25
Table 6: More Results for Interactions of Cabinet Changes 
Seigniorage =  ∆RM/GDP  ∆RM/GDP  ∆RM/GDP  ∆RM/GDP  ∆RM/GR 
  1 2 3 4 5 
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Domestic Debt)] (-1) 
.676 
(2.20)** 
    
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Domestic Debt)] (-1) 
-.064 
(-.60) 
    




   




   
[Cabinet changes * (1960s)] (-1)      .175 
(1.28) 
  
[Cabinet changes * (1970s)] (-1)      .353 
(1.85)* 
  
[Cabinet changes * (1980s)] (-1)      .415 
(1.82)* 
  
[Cabinet changes * (1990s)] (-1)      .195 
(.97) 
  








[Cabinet changes * (Western 
Hemisphere)] (-1) 




[Cabinet changes * (Other 
Developing Countries)] (-1) 




[Cabinet changes * (Industrial 
Countries)] (-1) 












































427 #  Observations  1860 2361 2386 2383 1742 
#  Countries  97 98 98 98 85 
Adjusted R
2  .21 .27 .23 .23 .25 
Notes: -  Panel regressions controlling for fixed effects; 
-  In column 1 to 4, Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the ratio of the change in 
reserve money (IFS, line 14) to total nominal GDP (IFS, line 99b). In column 5, seigniorage is the 
ratio of the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14) to government revenues (IFS, line 81); 
-  Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Their estimated 
coefficients are not shown in order to economize space; 
-  T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 
5%, and *, 10%.  26
Table 7: Results for Interactions of other proxies of political instability 
 1  2  3 
[Government crises * (Inflation ≥ 50%)] (-1)  3.908 
(4.15)*** 
  
[Government crises * (Inflation < 50%)] (-1)  -.088 
(-.94) 
  
[Executive changes * (Inflation ≥ 50%)] (-1)    1.837 
(2.76)*** 
 
[Executive changes * (Inflation < 50%)] (-1)    .091 
(.85) 
 
[Index of Political Cohesion * Inflation ≥ 50%)] (-1)      1.763 
(3.73)*** 
[Index of Political Cohesion * Inflation < 50%)] (-1)      .115 
(1.38) 
























42 # Observations  2354  2356  1648 
# Countries  98  98  98 
Adjusted R
2  .26 .24 .24 
Notes: -  Panel regressions controlling for fixed effects; 
-  Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the ratio of the change in 
reserve money (IFS, line 14) to total nominal GDP (IFS, line 99b); 
-  Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s). Their estimated coefficients are not shown in order to economize space; 
-  T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
 
 
   27
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis 
 Complete  Sample 
∆ Reserve Money / Government Revenues 
Sample of Developing Countries 
∆ Reserve Money / GDP 
3-Year Moving Averages of Cabinet Changes 
∆ Reserve Money / GDP 
  1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9  10  11 













[Cabinet changes * 
(Inflation ≥ 50%)] (-1) 
   30.365 
(2.12)** 
    1.619 
(2.48)** 
   2.686 
(2.42)** 
 
[Cabinet changes * 
(Inflation < 50%)] (-1) 
   1.474 
(1.32) 
    .093 
(.70) 
   .210 
(1.06) 
 
[Cabinet changes * 
(Devel. Countries)] (-1) 
    6.266 
(2.69)*** 
       .758 
(2.70)*** 
[Cabinet changes *  
(Ind. Countries)] (-1) 
    -.195 
(-.37) 
       -.217 
(-2.02)** 




     -1.376 
(-6.07)*** 
   -1.171 
(-5.96)*** 
   




















































































# Observations  1297 1742 1694 1742  1298 1982 1859 1644 2343 2137 2343 
# Countries  75 85 84 85  70 81 81 87 98 98 98 
Adjusted R
2  .26 .24 .27 .25  .28 .21 .22 .31 .23 .26 .23 
Notes: - Panel  regressions with fixed effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
-  Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Their estimated coefficients are not shown in order to economize space; 
-  The sample and the definition of seigniorage used (the dependent variable) are indicated in the first row. 
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